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Abstract
Our focus in this Article is not predominantly on the doctrinal intricacies of the constitutional
framework in Northern Ireland. In fact, while we acknowledge the considerable sophistication of
that framework, one of our contentions is that an overly legalistic focus on the shape and forms of
constitutional architecture masks key questions concerning the broader political and ideological
role of constitution-making. We will argue that the particular exigencies of constitution-making
in a post-conflict society require a broader understanding of the notion and role of constitutional
law. We attempt to trace the source of constitutional ideas in the jurisdiction, and the role of
constitutional and legal structures as public symbols, which chart the transition from violence.
Part I of this Article considers the role of factors indigenous to the Northern Ireland conflict, which
shaped the constitutional settlement, including the political fault lines and the changing view of
the law among some of the key protagonists. Part II analyzes the international influence on the
constitutional settlement, including the previous U.S. Administration, the European Union (”EU”),
the European Convention of Human Rights (”ECHR”), and the strategy of “internationalizing”
particularly difficult issues (such as weapons decommissioning), which were arguably beyond the
political capacity of the local participants to agree upon among themselves. Part III considers the
respective constitutional discourses of the governments of the UK (in particular, the commitment
of the Labour Administration to the devolution of power), and the Republic of Ireland, which
assumed the responsibility as stewards of the negotiation and implementation phases. Part IV then
contrasts the current constitutional settlement with its historical antecedents, and considers how
thinking of constitution-making as a process, which takes us ”beyond the constitutional moment,”
and enhances our understanding of the role of constitutions in the art of peacemaking.
CONSTITUTIONAL AND
INSTITUTIONAL DIMENSIONS
BEYOND THE "CONSTITUTIONAL
MOMENT": LAW, TRANSITION, AND
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Kieran McEvoy &John Morison*
INTRODUCTION
The 1990s saw increasing scholarly attention concerning the
relationship between constitutional design, conflict transforma-
tion, and democratic renewal.' Since the peace process in
Northern Ireland emerged in the mid-1990s, Northern Ireland
has featured heavily in such discussions.2 The Belfast Agreement
(or Good Friday Agreement),' concluded after almost two years
of protracted negotiations in 1998, and the Northern Ireland
Act, which implemented many of its provisions,4 have been
* The authors are, respectively, Professor of Law and Transitional Justice and Pro-
fessor of Jurisprudence in the School of Law, Queens University Belfast. The authors
would like to acknowledge the advice, commentary, and good humor of our colleague,
Dr. Gordon Anthony in writing this Article and the patience and encouragement of
Professors Colm Campbell and Fionnuala Ni Aoldin. John Morison also wishes to ac-
knowledge the support of ESRC Devolution and Constitutional Change programme
through project grant L 219252114 and the Royal Irish Academy Third Sector Research
Grants Program.
1. See generally DONALD HOROWITZ, A DEMOCRATIC SOUTH AFRICA? CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGINEERING IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY (1991); Donald Horowitz, The Northern Ireland Agree-
ment: Consociational, Maximalist, and Risky, in NORTHERN IREtAND AND THE DIVIDED
WORLD (John McGarry ed., 2000); GIOVANNI SARTORI, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL
ENGINEERING., AN INQUIRY INlO STRUCTURES, INCENTIVES AND OUTCOMES (1997); Katha-
rine Belmont et al., Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy,
in THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT, AND DIVERSITY I (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002) [hereinafter REYNOLDS, THE ARCHI-
TECTURE OF DEMOCRACY].
2. See, e.g., Brendan O'Leary, The Belfast Agreement and the British-Irish Agreement:
Consociational, Confederal Institutions, A Federacy and a Peace Process, in REYNOLDS, THE
ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra n.1, at 293; Arend Lijphart, The Wave of Power-Shar-
ing Democracy, in REYNOLDS, THE ARCHITECTURE OF DEMOCRACY, supra nI, at 37.
3. Agreement Reached in Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998, Ir.-UK [herein-
after Agreement or Belfast Agreement]. The Agreement is also known as the Good
Friday Agreement, commemorating the day on which it was signed.
4. Northern Ireland Act, 1998, ch. 47 (Eng.).
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widely lauded by lawyers and political scientists for their constitu-
tional sophistication. While the Agreement's ultimate fate re-
mains subject to the vicissitudes of party politics in Northern Ire-
land, the accord was and is quite a remarkable achievement. Af-
ter almost three decades of a seemingly intractable political
conflict, which saw more than 3,600 people killed, and tens of
thousands injured,6 the Agreement was reached and endorsed
by the vast majority of the people of Ireland, both North and
South. The Agreement and enabling legislation established a
constitutional framework for a devolved administration in
Northern Ireland, with a power-sharing Executive and complex
consociational voting arrangements to ensure that neither the
Unionist nor the Nationalist community could dominate the lo-
cal Assembly.7 New arrangements were made to regulate the re-
lations between the jurisdiction and the governments of the
United Kingdom ("UK") and the Republic of Ireland. A range
of provisions were introduced to give institutional expression to
commitment within the Agreement to human rights and equal-
ity, and a variety of independent and quasi-independent mecha-
nisms were established to deal with particularly problematic is-
sues, including the release of politically-motivated prisoners, the
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, and policing and re-
form of the criminal justice system. 8
Our focus in this Article is not predominantly on the doctri-
nal intricacies of the constitutional framework in Northern Ire-
land. In fact, while we acknowledge the considerable sophistica-
tion of that framework, one of our contentions is that an overly
legalistic focus on the shape and forms of constitutional architec-
ture masks key questions concerning the broader political and
ideological role of constitution-making. We will argue that the
particular exigencies of constitution-making in a post-conflict so-
5. See generally Colin Harvey, The New Beginning.- Reconstructing Constitutional Law
and Democracy in Northern Ireland, in HUMAN RIGHTS, EQUALITY AND DEMOCRATIC RE-
NEWAL IN NORTiERN IRELAND 9 (Colin Harvey ed., 2001); ASPECTS OF TIE BELFAST
ACREEMENT (Rick Wilford ed., 2001).
6. See generally DAVID McKIFRICK ET AL., LOST LIVES: THE STORIES OF TIIE MEN,
WOMEN AND CHILDREN WHO DIED AS A RESULT OF THlE NORTHERN IRELAND CONFLICT
(1991).
7. See Brendan O'Leary, The Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1628,
1629-41 (1999).
8. For a useful overview of the full range of issues dealt with by the Agreement see
22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1133 (1999), containing twenty-five separate contributions.
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ciety require a broader understanding of the notion and role of
constitutional law. We attempt to trace the source of constitu-
tional ideas in the jurisdiction, and the role of constitutional and
legal structures as public symbols, which chart the transition
from violence.
Our analysis is divided into three substantive sections. Part I
of this Article considers the role of factors indigenous to the
Northern Ireland conflict, which shaped the constitutional set-
tlement, including the political fault lines and the changing view
of law among some of the key protagonists. Part II analyzes the
international influence on the constitutional settlement, includ-
ing the previous U.S. Administration, the European Union
("EU"), the European Convention of Human Rights ("ECHR"),
and the strategy of "internationalizing" particularly difficult is-
sues (such as weapons decommissioning), which were arguably
beyond the political capacity of the local participants to agree
upon among themselves. Part III considers the respective consti-
tutional discourses of the governments of the UK (in particular,
the commitment of the Labour Administration to the devolution
of power), and the Republic of Ireland, which assumed the re-
sponsibility as stewards of the negotiation and implementation
phases. Part IV then contrasts the current constitutional settle-
ment with its historical antecedents, and considers how thinking
of constitution-making as a process, which takes us "beyond the
constitutional moment," and enhances our understanding of the
role of constitutions in the art of peacemaking.
Before examining the sources for the constitutional settle-
ment, it is important to establish the background to the current
Article and to ask the fundamental question as to whether the
Agreement and its implementing legislation may be rightly re-
ferred to as "a constitution."
I. DOES NORTHERN IRELAND HAVE A CONSTITUTION?
The notion that the Northern Ireland Act and the Belfast
Agreement may be a constitution is, of course, predicated on
certain key assumptions about what a constitution is.9 Within
any context where British notions of constitutionalism apply, the
9. See generally ROBERT ALEXANDER, THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE: A CONSTITUTION FOR
TOMORROW (1998); JOHN MORISON ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO CONSTITUTIONAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAw (2003).
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idea of a constitution is a difficult one. This relates to much
more than the simple assertion that the constitution is not writ-
ten down in a single document. It refers more widely to ideas
about the foundations of authority and the extent to which mod-
ern ideas about limited government can be said to have evolved
behind the facade of Britain's historic constitution. The notion
manifests itself very clearly in the nature of the constitutional
framework in Northern Ireland, where ideas of a new constitu-
tional beginning for resolving a historic problem are overlaid
with older ideas about the sovereign nature of Parliament's
power to intervene via the Northern Ireland Act 2000,"' when
the new arrangements threaten not to operate.
The term "constitution" in the UK may be said to have at
least two meanings: there are those rules that describe how
power is distributed, and there is a more normative sense of con-
stitutionalism, which describes the way in which power ought to
be exercised. Clearly, in the UK there do exist rules about who
exercises power lawfully. These rules, while they may not have
their origin in a single document, do nevertheless make up a
constitution in the limited sense of the phrase. Constitutional-
ism, however, in the sense of a requirement of limited govern-
ment, is even less formally organized, and despite some formal
sources, particularly the Human Rights Act of 1998," much de-
pends on informal understandings and practices. This has led
some commentators to declare that in the UK generally, the con-
stitution is simply "what happens."" Indeed, constitutionalism
in the UK often is reduced to the bare proposition that all sover-
eignty resides with the Westminster Parliament, which is free to
make or unmake any law it pleases. This, in turn, leads to a view
that no particular law is of higher standing than any other, or
has constitutional status as such. As Dicey put it: "neither the
Act of Union... nor the Dentists Act, 1878, has more claim than
the other to be considered a supreme law."'"
This fundamental adherence to notions of parliamentary
sovereignty gives a particular and peculiar character to any claim
10. Northern Ieland Act 2000, ch. I (Eng.).
I. Human Rights Act 1998 (Eng.).
12. See John Aneurin Grey Griffith, The Political Constitution 42 MODERN L. REV. 1,
19 (1979).
13. See AtIERT VENN DIEy, INTRODUCTION TO T1lE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CON-
STITUTION 145 (10th ed. 1961).
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that Northern Ireland has a constitution, as such. Although the
British idea of sovereignty includes reference to the "sovereignty
of the people" (in the sense that the House of Commons is
popularly elected), the UK system traditionally lacks a clear un-
derstanding that legal sovereignty can reside anywhere outside
the Westminster Parliament. Any grant of power to, for exam-
ple, a devolved legislature is simply that - power given under
licence and not power ceded in any federal sense. Indeed, the
record of devolution, both in the version that occurred in North-
ern Ireland in 1920, and in the New Labour manifestations in
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, very clearly shows that
each constitutional act reserves ultimate sovereign power at
Westminster. For Scotland and Wales, this is unlikely to provide
much of a practical problem - at least until the political loyal-
ties of governments in Cardiff and Edinburgh diverge widely
from that in Westminster. In Northern Ireland, however, sover-
eignty remains an issue of lively, practical, political importance.
The capacity of the Westminster government to suspend the
institutions of devolution via powers given in the Northern Ire-
land Act of 2000 is very far from theoretical only. Indeed, on
four occasions to date, a British Secretary of State has found it
necessary to use the powers of the Northern Ireland Act of 2000
to suspend devolution on a temporary basis. Within one tradi-
tional analysis of British constitutionalism, such use of power is
relatively unremarkable constitutionally - if controversial politi-
cally. This orthodox view holds that there is nothing to distin-
guish either the Agreement or the subsequent legislation -
however important they may be in political terms - from any
other act of Parliament. Such a view would suggest that the
Agreement has been implemented only because the sovereign
Westminster Parliament has ordained that it should be, and
therefore, it can be removed by the same body in a similar fash-
ion.
From another perspective, the Good Friday Agreement and
the resulting Northern Ireland Act of 1998, are something differ-
ent. In a departure from the UK tradition, a link between consti-
tutionalism and notions of "the sovereignty of the people," has
underpinned the Belfast Agreement since its inception. Popular
support for the Agreement was seen as crucial, and it was for this
reason, that referendums were held simultaneously in both
2003]
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Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. 4 In this sense,
the Agreement represents a new constitutional beginning with
its origins very clearly in ideas of consent and popular sover-
eignty. There is also the added factor that the Agreement has an
international dimension as well, in so far as it factors in the Re-
public of Ireland and the very different constitutional traditions
and understandings there.' 5 Of course, the Northern Ireland
Act of 1998 stands independent of the international strands, but
here, as elsewhere in the new structures for governance in
Northern Ireland, it is easy to argue that something new and
different was clearly envisaged. "
Thus, while some orthodox UK constitutional law ap-
proaches would reject the notion that popular support or a con-
nection with other constitutional traditions imbues the Agree-
ment and the corresponding legislation with any particular "con-
stitutional" qualities, other constitutional readings might take a
more expansive view. Some support for the second approach
has come, perhaps surprisingly, from the courts. For example,
there is one recent judgement of the House of Lords, which ap-
pears to suggest that the Agreement and the corresponding leg-
islation should be taken as constitutional in form. In Robinson v.
Sec'y of State for Northern Ireland and Others,'7 a case concerning
the interpretation of key provisions of the Northern Ireland Act
14. As discussed below, the referendum in the Irish Republic was required to en-
dorse the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Republic's constitution, which identi-
fied the national territory as including the "whole island of Ireland." The holding of
the referenda simultaneously in both parts of Ireland, also allowed Republicans to
claim that the "Irish people" were exercising their right to self-determination for the
first time since the country was partitioned, against the wishes of the majority.
15. In the Republic, Article 6 of its written constitution states that "[a]ll powers of
government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people,
whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all
questions of national policy, according to the requirements of the common good." The
Irish constitution of 1937 (Bunreacht na Eireann) was adopted only after a plebiscite on
December 29, 1937. Article 46 states that constitutional amendment can, likewise, be
achieved only with the consent of the people, as expressed in referenda (Casey 2000).
At its very heart, therefore, the Irish constitution, as do many others, emphasises the
importance of popular support for the institutions of government, and for any change
to the structures of the State.
16. It is interesting to notice that much academic commentary that was produced
around the time of the Agreement, reflects very clearly the idea that this was a new
departure, as it picks up on ideas of "reconstruction," "renewal," and "transcending,"
that were also present in the political rhetoric of the time.
17. Robinson v. Sec'y of State for Northern Ireland and Others, [2002] N.I. 390.
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of 1998, a 3-2 majority of the House considered that the context
that gave rise to the Northern Ireland Act of 1998 demanded a
modified approach to interpretation. The House's statement in
this regard was, at one level, significant because it added to ex-
isting judicial statements about the special constitutional status
of the wider body of devolution legislation in the UK. 8 But
much more significant was the House's emphasis on the very
unique dynamics of the Northern Ireland settlement. In finding
that the provisions at issue'9 should be interpreted purposively,
and in the light of the general principles and values that under-
pin the Agreement, the House chose to highlight how the
Northern Ireland Act of 1998 was almost without comparison.
As Lord Hoffman said:
In choosing between (different) approaches to construction,
it is necessary to have regard to the background to the 1998
Act. It was passed to give effect to the Belfast Agreement con-
cluded on Good Friday 1998. This Agreement was the prod-
uct of multi-party negotiations to devise constitutional ar-
rangements for a fresh start in Northern Ireland. The 1998
Act is a constitution for Northern Ireland, framed to create a con-
tinuing form of government against the background of the
history of the territory and the principles agreed in Belfast.
The long title of the Act is "to make new provision for the
government of Northern Ireland for the purpose of imple-
menting the Agreement reached at multi-party talks on
Northern Ireland." According to established principles of interpre-
tation, the Act must be construed against the background of the politi-
cal situation in Northern Ireland and the principles laid down by the
Belfast Agreement for a new start. These facts and documents
form part of the admissible background to the construction
of the Actjust as much as the Revolution, the Convention and
18. "We should recognise a hierarchy of Acts of Parliament: as it were, 'ordinary'
statutes and 'constitutional' statutes. The two categories must be distinguished on a
principled basis. In my opinion, a constitutional statute is one which (a) conditions the
legal relationship between citizen and State in some general, overarching manner, or
(b) enlarges or diminishes the scope of what we would now regard as fundamental
constitutional rights." Thoburn v. Sunderland County Council, [2002] 1 C.M.L.R. 50,
62 (QBD Admin. Ct.).
19. The specific issue was whether the courts should regard a six-week time limit
for the election of a First and Deputy First Minister as mandatory, in the sense that fresh
Assembly elections should be called on its expiry. See generally Gordon Anthony, Public
Law Litigation and the Belfast Agreement, 8 EuR. Puts. L. 401 (2002); Marie Lynch, Political
Adjudication or Statutory Interpretation: Robinson v. Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, 53
N. IR. LEGAL Q. 327 (2002).
20031
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the Federalist Papers are the background to construing the
Constitution of the United States. 20
This statement clearly implies that the Northern Ireland Act
of 1998 - its existence, form, and purpose - cannot, and
should not, be conceived of in traditional UK constitutional law
terms. Orthodox constitutional approaches in the UK link the
courts' role in the interpretation of legislation to the singular
objective of implementing the intentions of the sovereign Parlia-
ment.2 ' While Lord Hoffman's approach does not, as such, sug-
gest that the interpretation of the legislation should be divorced
from the intentions of the legislature, his emphasis on the con-
text that gave rise to the Belfast Agreement preceding the Act,
adds a new dimension. The fact that the Northern Ireland elec-
torate expressed support for the Agreement has, for example,
also been said by one judge to provide "formidable support" for
post-Agreement changes to policing.22 This does not, as yet, sug-
gest that the Westminster Parliament is no longer sovereign over
Northern Ireland affairs (viz Section 1 of the Northern Ireland
Act 1998, and the corresponding fact that the Northern Ireland
Act 2000 provides for the suspension of the Northern Ireland
institutions, which has occurred four times since their incep-
tion).2 ' The fact does, however, suggest that changes in North-
ern Ireland politics are prompting changed judicial perceptions.
Constitutions cannot, after all, be made complete in one day,
and while the courts will still give effect to the most recent acts of
the Westminster Parliament, the fact that subsequent legislation
envisages a final return to the 1998 Act indicates that that Act
remains, on account of its context, truly unique. In conse-
quence, it can be argued that the Act will be maintained not only
because it is a manifestation of the wishes of the Northern Ire-
land people, but also because related processes of constitutional
change in the Republic of Ireland demand fidelity.
Despite the current partial suspension of elements of the
Agreement (the Executive, Assembly and cross-border bodies
discussed below), other elements - such as equality and human
20. Robinson v. Sec'y of State for Northern Ireland and Others, [2002] N.I. 390
(emphasis added).
21. Duport Steels Ltd. v. Sirs, [1980] 1 W.L.R. 142, 157 (Lord Diplock).
22. In the Matter of an Application by Mark Parsons forJudicial Review (N. Ir. H.
Ct.) [2002].
23. See disctssion infra, Part IV.
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rights provisions, new policing arrangements, criminal justice re-
form, the provisions for the release of politically motivated pris-
oners, etc. - all remain in place. Whatever the current exigen-
cies, the Agreement remains the constitutional template around
which all future political progress will be framed.24 It is an inter-
national treaty signed by the sovereign governments of the UK
and the Irish Republic. The judiciary has begun to address, how-
ever tentatively, the idea that the Northern Ireland Act repre-
sents something more than simply one more Act of Parliament.
It represents a tangible expression of the will of the people of
Ireland, North and South. It addresses not only issues about who
has power, but also how power is to be exercised. It lays down
the terms upon which people in Northern Ireland, from all com-
munities, are willing to be governed. It represents, in our view, a
fundamental "constitutional moment" wherein the Agreement
and the Act that implemented it, are constituent acts in the estab-
lishment of a new polity.
II. THE SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL PEACEMAKING:
THE INDIGENOUS FACTORS
This constitutional moment has come about as a result of a
complex set of conditions, processes, and initiatives operating in
relation to a diverse range of actors. Constitution-building here
has been about more than simply arranging how government is
to be organized - it has been aimed at providing a framework
for addressing fundamental ethical problems about how a di-
vided society can reach an accommodation that will allow it to
govern itself. This process of "constitutional peacemaking" is
about much more than simply designing a blueprint for govern-
ment: it involves managing the creation and implementation of
the design and a whole series of related, if apparently uncon-
nected, issues as the process is rolled out in practice.25
24. "The British government will simply not countenance any path other than im-
plementing the Agreement. And we must implement the Agreement in full, because it
is the choice of the people; the people here, the people in the south and the people of
the United Kingdom as a whole. I honestly believe there is no other way." British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, Speech on Peace in Belfast (Oct. 17, 2002), available at
http://politics.guardian.co.uk.
25. See David Horowitz, Constitutional Desig-n: Proposal versus Process (paper
presented at the Kellogg Institute Conference, Constitutional Design 2000: Institu-
tional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy in the Late Twentieth Century,
University of Notre Dame, 1999), available at http://www.nd.edu.
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Constitutional discourses in Northern Ireland have, since
the formation of the State, been framed by the presence or
threat of political violence. Following a sustained campaign of
political violence against the British rule in Ireland led by the
Irish Republican Army, and a parallel campaign of violence by
Protestant paramilitaries in favor of it, the island of Ireland was
partitioned in 1921, creating separate Parliaments in the North-
east and South of the country.2" The 1920 Government of Ire-
land Act introduced a devolved government to the region of
Northern Ireland, granting some law-making power to the new
Parliament and retaining others at Westminster. Although a
number of innovative features were included in the original con-
stitutional framework, designed to offer some solace to the Na-
tionalist minority,27 most of these features were quickly removed
or proved to be useless by the end of the 1920s.28 The Unionist
party was never out of power between 1922 and 1972. A "Speak-
ers Convention" developed at Westminster, which forbade dis-
cussion of matters within the purview of the Northern Ireland
Parliament, thus ensuring little effective oversight from that
quarter.2 9 Additionally, ever-fearful of the seditious threat of the
IRA, the Unionist government enacted a wide range of perma-
nent emergency powers, and recruited a local militia whose pri-
mary task was to vigorously suppress any potential armed opposi-
tion to the State from the ranks of the IRA or other Republican
groups.
Drawing its inspiration from similar events in the United
States, Europe, and elsewhere, the civil rights movement began
in the 1960s to highlight the discriminatory nature of the North-
ern Ireland system of governance, and included demands for
electoral reform, impartial policing, and equal opportunities in
jobs and housing allocation. A complex combination of a vio-
lent State reaction to civil protests, the outbreak of organized
26. See generally TIM PAT COOGAN, THE I.R.A. (1987); MICHAEL FARRELL, NORTHERN
IRELAND THE ORANGE STATE (1976);JOSEPH LEE, IRELAND, 1912-1985: POLITICS AND So-
CIETrY (1989).
27. These included proportional representation for elections to the new Parlia-
ment, anti-discrimination provisions, and a "Council of Ireland" designed to foster links
between the governments of North and South.
28. See generally PATRICK BUCKLAND, THE FATrORV OF GRIEVANCES: DEVOLVED Gov-
ERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND, 1921-39 (1979).
29. See generally JAMES CALLAGHAN, A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE DILEMMA OF NORTHERN
IRELAND (1973).
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political violence by Loyalist and Republican paramilitaries, and
a perception that the local Unionist authorities had lost control,
resulted in the suspension of the Stormont government and the
reintroduction of direct rule from London in 1972.3o Despite a
number of abortive attempts at reintroducing various forms of
devolution,3" direct rule remained largely in place as the
adopted form of governing the jurisdiction until the Agreement
and Northern Ireland Act of 2000. In addition, as discussed fur-
ther in the concluding section, it has become the default setting
on those four occasions, when the most recent version of devolu-
tion has faltered.
Thus, oversimplifying for the sake of brevity, the basic politi-
cal fault lines that shaped the settlement of 1921 were also those
that contributed to the outbreak of violence in 1969, and its con-
tinuation until the cease-fires of 1994. These were:
(a) the formalization of a Unionist/Protestant majority in
the State, with a guaranteed political hegemony in the
governance of Northern Ireland,32 and the coercive ap-
paratus to maintain that supremacy through emergency
legislation and a partial police force;
(b) the parallel corralling of a Nationalist/Catholic minor-
ity within the State, who were excluded from political
power and discriminated against by the Unionist major-
ity ever-suspicious of their "loyalty" to the Northern
Irish State;33
(c) a residual faith among a minority within the Catholic
community in the use of violence which, while largely
dormant for long periods of the State's existence, re-
emerged in the wake of the State's response to the civil
30. See generally HENRY KELLY, How STORMONT FELL (1973).
31. See generally BRIGID HADFIELD, THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTHERN IRELAND
(1989).
32. The original population breakdown in Northern Ireland was approximately
66% Protestant and 33% Catholic. However, demographic and population changes
have seen a gradual equalizing of the respective religious blocks, with some commenta-
tors suggesting that the current population may consist of 50% Protestants, 45%
Catholics, and 4% "other." See David McKittrick, Protestants Stand on the Brink of Losing
their Majority in Northern Ireland, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 11, 2002, available at http://news.
independent.co.uk/uk/ulster/story.jsp?story=l 19350.
33. Kieran McEvoy & Ciaran White, Security Vetting in Northern Ireland: Loyalty Ae-
dress and Citizenship, 61 MODERN L. REV. 341 (1998).
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rights campaign; 4
(d) the continuation of pre-partition allegiances through-
out the society with Unionists/Loyalists intent on main-
taining the constitutional link with Britain and Nation-
alists/Republicans focused on the re-unification of the
national territory of Ireland; and
(e) the related roles and responsibilities of the respective
British and Southern Irish States that have, broadly
speaking, supported the respective constitutional posi-
tions of the Unionist and Nationalist blocks since parti-
tion with the UK, maintaining an essentially pro-union
position and the Irish State supporting Nationalists.
Therefore, the constitutional settlement ultimately reached
as a result of the negotiations in the late 1990s, required an ar-
chitecture, which could accommodate these competing dynam-
ics and the ways in which they played out between the two pre-
dominant communities. Nationalists required some form of
power-sharing arrangements, which ensured that no political
party or block could dominate as under the Stormont regime;
that the State system of justice and policing would be fair and
impartial; that mechanisms to ensure that their human rights
and capacity to participate equally in social and civic life would
be put in place; and that the settlement would include some tan-
gible expression of their Irish identity through formal constitu-
tional links with the Irish Republic. Unionists, on the other
hand, wanted to ensure that the link with Britain and their Brit-
ish identity would be maintained while they remained a majority
in Northern Ireland; and that they, too, could gain access to the
exercise of power in the jurisdiction and ameliorate the "demo-
cratic deficit," which came about as a result of the imposition of
direct rule. Unionists also wanted the IRA and other Republican
violence designed to drive them into a united Ireland to cease,
and to minimize whatever constitutional provisions were created,
formalizing the links between Northern Ireland and the Irish Re-
public. 5 For their part, the British and Irish governments (hav-
ing increasingly accepted the principal that joint stewardship of
the Northern Ireland problem was the most effective manage-
34. See NIALL 0. DocHFARTAItui, FROM Civii RIGHTS TO ARMELITES : DERRY AND THE
BIRTH OF IRISH TROUBLES (1997).
35. For a more detailed discussion of Unionist objectives, see David Trimble, The
Befast Agreement, 22 FoRIALAM INI'L L:J. 1145 (1999).
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ment strategy since the signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement in
1985)36, required a re-framing of their respective constitutional
arrangements concerning the jurisdiction.
It is not our intention here to offer an exhaustive overview
of the complex structure of the Agreement and Northern Ire-
land Act that were framed by these various dynamics.3 ' Rather,
we offer a brief overview and then focus on a number of key
themes, which are of particular relevance for our current pur-
poses.
With regard to its internal Northern Ireland political
dimensions, the Agreement is often broadly described as "conso-
ciational" in nature.38 It provides for the creation of a devolved
Assembly in Northern Ireland and a power sharing Executive,
chaired by a First Minister and Deputy First Minister who are, in
practice, drawn from the respective Unionist and Nationalist
blocks. The other ministerial members of the Executive (and,
indeed, the chairs of the various Assembly Committees, who
oversee the work of ministers), are allocated according to the
electoral strength of their parties." The rules on cross-commu-
nity procedures, including parallel consent and weighted majori-
ties, are designed to protect Nationalists from Unionist domina-
tion (and presumably vice versa in the event of further demo-
graphic changes). In essence, the Assembly is free to pass
legislation in any policy area, other than those classified as "ex-
cepted matters" and "reserved matters" (e.g. defence or taxa-
tion), which remain within the realm of Westminster.
36. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K-Ir. [hereinafter Anglo-Irish Agreement].
37. See supra n.8 and accompanying text.
38. See Brendan O'Leary, The 1998 British Irish Agreement; Consociation Plus, SCOT.
AFF., 14 (1999); see also Robin Wilson, War by Other Means: Devolution and Community
Division in Northern Ireland (paper presented at the American Political Science Associa-
tion Conference in Boston, 2002), available at http://apsaproceedings.cp.org. In this
context, "consociational" means a political arrangement which meets the following four
criteria: cross community executive power-sharing, proportionality rules applied to all
relevant government and public sectors, community self-government, and equality in
cultural life and veto rights for minorities. See AREND LIlImHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL
SOCIETIS: A COMPARATIVE EXPLORATION (1977).
39. See Rick Wilford, The Assembly and the Executive, in AsPEcTrs OF THE BELFAST
AGREEMENT (Rick Wilford ed., 2001) [hereinafter WILFORD, ASPECtS OF THE BELFAST
AGREEMENT]. Perhaps the most significant outcome of this procedure was its guarantee
of two Ministerial seats for the IRA's political wing, Sinn Fein, and its witnessing of the
former IRA Chief of Staff, Martin McGuinness, becoming Minister for Education.
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As regards the constitutional status of Northern Ireland in
relation to the Republic of Ireland, the Agreement includes pro-
visions for cross-border institutional arrangements between
Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Given the politi-
cal priorities of Nationalists and Unionists to, respectively, maxi-
mize and minimize these aspects of the accord, the negotiations
of these constitutional features were among the most politically
controversial. 41' The Agreement establishes a North/South Min-
isterial Council and a range of North/South bodies that are de-
signed to provide a forum for the development and implementa-
tion of common policies of mutual benefit to Northern Ireland
and the Republic of Ireland across at least twelve policy areas
(including, for example, trade and business development, food
safety, and special EU matters). In order to allay the respective
fears of Nationalists and Unionists, the Agreement also contains
institutional "guarantees" that the North/South Ministerial
Council and the Northern Ireland Assembly are mutually inter-
dependent, and that one cannot successfully function without
the other. Thus, if the Unionists refuse to properly implement
the cross-border bodies, the Assembly should collapse, and, simi-
larly, if the Assembly collapses, these bodies are not supposed to
have any independent constitutional life of their own.4
As a quid pro quo for the Unionists for the creation of these
cross-border institutions, the Agreement also provides for the es-
tablishment of a British-Irish Council, a forum for bringing to-
gether all of the devolved administrations in these islands, in-
cluding the two governments and the devolved administrations
in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland.4 2 Finally, the Agree-
ment also establishes a new British-Irish Intergovernmental Con-
ference. The purpose of this Conference is designed to "bring
together the British and Irish Governments to promote bilateral co-opera-
40. See DEAGLAN DL BREIADUN, THE FAR SIDE OF REVENGF: MAKING PEACE IN NORT-
ERN IRELAND (2001).
41. However, in the most recent suspension it has been noteworthy how the re-
sponse has developed beyond the usual "care and maintenance" provisions to allow the
bodies to be "stored" safely. An exchange of letters between the two governments, en-
dorsed in the British-Irish Agreement (Amendment) Act 2002 passed by Dil Eireann,
now enables the two governments themselves to take on some of the functions of the
implementation bodies. This arrangement catused predictable fury in the Unionist
community, especially as legal challenge was not available.
42. See Graham Walker, The British Irish Council, in WILFORn, ASPECTIS OF -lIE BEL-
FAST AGREEMFNT, stp(ra n.39.
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tion at levels on all matters of mutual interest within the competence of
both governments.""M Historically, of course, intergovernmental re-
lations in this regard have been dominated by the "Northern Ire-
land question," a feature explicitly recognized by the Belfast
Agreement that refers to "the Irish Government's special interest in
Northern Ireland and of the extent to which issues of mutual concern
arise in relation to Northern Ireland."44 In effect, it is the forum
through which the two governments can continue to liase con-
cerning Northern Ireland matters, in particular when "normal"
political relations in Northern Ireland are absent, such as during
the suspension of the devolved institutions.
The self-evident political sophistication of these constitu-
tional arrangements was far from sufficient to meet the demands
created by the indigenous political fault lines of the jurisdiction.
Indeed, as indicated above, although there were some important
design differences, much of the basic constitutional architecture
had been present in the failed Sunningdale Agreement of
1973.4" The principal difference in 1998 was the inclusive na-
ture of the negotiations, and the absence of large-scale armed
violence. In 1973, the central philosophy of the negotiations
had been to build a center ground between Nationalists and
Unionists, and to exclude the extremists, particularly those who
would use violence for their political ends. Violence continued
unabated outside the negotiations, and, in fact, it was the activi-
ties of Loyalist paramilitaries (together with other Unionist ex-
tremists) that ultimately led to the collapse of the 1973 Agree-
ment.4" The negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement in
1998 included the political representatives of militant Republi-
canism and Loyalism, and occurred in the context of "military
cessations" from the main paramilitary groups. It is important,
also, to chart the political changes, which occurred within those
groups, particularly among Republicans, as a significant and im-
43. Agreement, supra n.3, Strand Three, para. 2 (emphasis added).
44. Agreement, supra n.3, Strand Three, para. 5 (emphasis added).
45. Seamus Mallon, former Deputy First Minister and Deputy Leader of the Social
Democratic and Labour Party ("SDLP"), once famously described the Agreement as
"Sunningdale for Slow Learners." For a more detailed comparison see Stefan Woolf,
Context and Content, Sun ningdale and Betfast Compared, in WILFORD, AsPECIS OF THE BFt-
lsl AGREEMENT, supra n.39.
46. See generatty DON ANDERSON, 14 MAN, DAYS: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE LO'ALIST
STRIKE OF 1974 (1994).
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perative source for developing the constitutional ideas that
shaped the Agreement.
In the years preceding the Agreement, the main Republican
and Loyalist paramilitary groups sought to develop "political"
strategies to accompany their military campaigns.17 The Loyal-
ists have achieved only partial success in this endeavour. 4 How-
ever, with regard to Republicans, Sinn F~in (the IRA's political
wing) has grown from an organization largely concerned with
"selling newspapers" in the 1970s, to the largest Nationalist party
in Northern Ireland and the fastest growing political party on
the island of Ireland."' The increased domination of the "politi-
cal" element of Irish Republicanism since the early 1980s, is a
complex narrative, well beyond the scope of this Article. How-
ever, what is germane in that process for our current discussion,
is the increased centrality which "law" has come to play as a key
part of the Republican "struggle." Republicanism has trans-
formed itself from a movement which, in the 1970s, expected
that IRA defendants would simply refuse to recognize the court
while on trial (as the practical and symbolic expression of the
British power in Ireland), to systematically using the law to chal-
lenge the State concerning prison conditions, torture, State kill-
ings, and securing the political rights of Sinn Fain, from the
1980s onwards. This capacity to use the law as a strategy of resis-
tance, was a key argument for those within Republicanism, who
were pressing for the abandonment of armed struggle in favour
of politics.'
As noted above, a key feature of the Belfast Agreement is
the centrality of human rights and equality protections. For ex-
ample, the Agreement makes reference to the incorporation of
the ECHR, a process to which the Labour government was al-
47. See generally MAILACHY O'DoiiERTY, THE TROUBLE wrriHi GUNS: REPUBLIrAN
STRATEGY AND THE PROVISIONAL IRA (1998); PETER TAYLOR, LOYALISiS: THE BOOK OF
lriE BBC TELEVISION SERIFS (1999).
48. The Progressive Unionist Party, the political wing of the paramilitary Ulster
Volunteer Force, secured only two seats in the Northern Ireland Assembly elections of
1998. The Ulster Democratic Party, the political wing of the Ulster Defence Associa-
tion, secured no seats and has since disbanded. Despite their limited electoral success
however, the leaders of these groups have received considerable accolades for their
skills in attempt to steer an arguably less disciplined and certainly less politicised con-
stituency (than the Republicans) away from political violence.
49. See generally BRIAN FEENEY, SINN FeIN: A HUNDRED TURBULENT YEARS (2002).
50. Interview with former IRA prisoner and Sinn Fin Councillor (Jan. 16 1995)
(on file with authors).
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ready committed throughout the UK. However, it also contains
a range of special provisions for Northern Ireland. The Agree-
ment provides for the establishment of a Human Rights Com-
mission, one of the primary tasks of which is to draft a Bill of
Rights specific to the jurisdiction.5 ' It also sets up an Equality
Commission, which centralizes responsibility for anti-discrimina-
tion on the grounds of religion, gender, disability, and race.52 In
the negotiations that led to the Agreement, Sinn Fain were
thought by some to be among the strongest advocates of these
measures,5 3 although there was support, too, among the other
parties (most notably the Social Democratic and Labour Party
("SDLP"), the Women's Coalition, and some of the smaller
Unionist parties).
In sum, the complex indigenous factors in Northern Ire-
land required a constitutional architecture capable of addressing
and balancing a number of competing relationships and dynam-
ics. The devolved local Assembly required complex procedural
rules of power-sharing and mutual consent to avoid the block
domination of the past. Nationalists required formal constitu-
tional links with the Irish Republic as a tangible acknowledge-
51. See Stephen Livingstone, The Northern heland Human Rights Commission, 22
FORoIIAM INT'L L.J. 1136, 1465-99 (1999).
52. The Equality Commission also has responsibility for reviewing the operation of
Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act of 1998, a far-reaching provision which places a
statutory duty on all public authorities to promote equality of opportunity, publish
"equality schemes," and carry out impact assessments as to the likely equality outcomes
of any decision. In effect, there is now in place a mechanism for mainstreaming equal-
ity into all aspects of policy formation and implementation in the government of North-
ern Ireland. This is a process, which goes well beyond the traditional anti-discrimina-
tion approach and concentrates, instead, upon government proactively, taking equality
into account as it devises policy. While there are some similar developments elsewhere
(particularly in Canada and within the gender mainstreaming work of the Council of
Europe), the depth and breadth of the Northern Ireland equality system is new and
potentially of considerable international significance. See Christopher McCrudden,
Mainstreaming Equality in the Governance of Northern Ireland, 22 FORDHAM INT'i- L.J. 1696
(1999); see also Christopher McCrudden, Equality, in HUMAN RiGHTS, EQUALITY AND
DEMOCRATIC RENEWAL IN NORTrHERN IRELAND (C. Harvey ed., 2001).
53. See Paul Mageean & Martin O'Brien, Prom the Margins to the Mainstream: Human
Rights and the Good Friday Peace Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1499, 1514 (1999). It is
interesting to note how the implementation of the "human rights and equality agenda"
has become a defining mantra of the modern Republican movement. This contrasts
starkly with earlier versions of Republicanism, wherein not only were such claims con-
siderably undermined by Republican violence, but they were often discounted on the
basis that they were "partitionist." For further discussion see Kieran McEvoy, Law, Strug-
gle and Political Transformation in Northern Ireland, 27 J.L. & Soc'v 542 (2000).
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ment of their Irish identity and the ultimate desire for reunifica-
tion. Unionists required guarantees that the cross-border bodies
were not an embryonic, all-Ireland structure, and that their "Brit-
ishness" was not being corroded. Hence, the British-Irish Coun-
cil was viewed as a potential counterbalance. As discussed in
greater detail below, assuming that the enmity and division of
the past thirty years would be unlikely to lead to a smooth shar-
ing of power, the British and Irish governments continued to
require a mechanism for their de facto joint political stewardship
of the Northern Ireland problem through the British and Irish
Intergovernmental Conference. Finally, Nationalists and Repub-
licans in particular, required an extensive array of human rights
and equality provisions to ensure that the systemic discrimina-
tion of the past could not be repeated in the new dispensation.
III. THE SOURCES OF CONSTITUTIONAL PEACEMAKING:
THE INTERNATIONAL FACTORS
The notion that "international involvement" is a prerequi-
site in seeking to resolve longstanding political conflicts, has in-
creasingly become something of an established principle in con-
flict resolution. 54 In a context of ever-increasing globalized in-
fluence on State governance in general,55 it is our view that
peacemaking, in particular, requires sustained and strategic in-
ternational support and encouragement. In the Irish context,
the ways in which the ultimate constitutional settlement was
shaped by international influences may be divided into four key
themes, each linked to different stages of the peacemaking pro-
cess. First, a number of important international influences con-
tributed to the "scene setting" in which the negotiations oc-
curred. Second, in terms of the constitutional architecture of
the Agreement, its design drew heavily upon international ideas,
norms, and values, which were seen to be directly relevant to the
Northern Ireland context. Third, in terms of its implementa-
tion, the governance of the peacemaking process required direct
involvement from a range of supportive international players,
54. See generally JOHN BURTON, CONFLIct" RESOLUTION - ITS LANGUAGE AND
PROCESSES (1997); ALAN TIDWELL, CONFLICT RESOLVED? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF CON-
FLICT RESOLUTION (1998); HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL PEACEBUILDING: INTO THE EYE
OF THE STORM Uohn Paul Lederach ed., 2002).
55. See generally GLOBALISATION AND GOVERNANCE (Aseem Prakash &Jeffrey A. Hart
eds.. 1999).
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particularly in the most highly sensitive areas, where the "inter-
nationalization" of acute problems was required. In particular,
with regard to a number of key matters concerned with security,
the internationalization of issues, such as the release of politi-
cally motivated prisoners, the reform of policing, and the
decommissioning of paramilitary weapons, became the central
technique for the "management" of transition during the peace
process.
The political context in which the negotiations took place,
was framed by a range of important international influences.
For example, the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the
effective end of the Cold War, certainly facilitated the announce-
ment in 1990 by the then Secretary of State for Northern Ire-
land, Peter Brook, that Britain had "no selfish, strategic, or eco-
nomic interest in Northern Ireland," thus addressing a central
assumption of Republicans since the 1970s. 6 Again, the transi-
tion from the apartheid system in South Africa was a key influ-
ence. While Republicans have previously had some ties with the
African National Congress ("ANC"), the 1990s saw a broader
cross-fertilization of ideas, visits, study groups, and so forth, be-
tween various political actors and members of civil society in ei-
ther jurisdiction.5 v In addition, the increased interest of the
Clinton Administration in the emerging peace process, and, in
particular, the granting of an entry visa to the United States for
Gerry Adams, and later, Joe Cahill, have been widely viewed as
central to the preparations for the IRA cessation.58 Finally, there
was the related decision by the two governments to appoint in-
ternational chairmen, led by Senator George Mitchell, to chair
56. See generally Michael Cox, Northern Ireland After the Cold War, in A FAREWELL TO
ARMS? FROM 'LONG WAR' 'O LONG PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND (Michael Cox et al. eds.,
2000) [hereinafter Cox, A FAREWELL TO ARMS?]; Adrian Guelke, InternationalDimensions
of the Belfast Agreement, in WILFORD, ASPECTS OF T[-HE BELFAST AGREEMENT, supra n.39.
57. See generally Paul Arthur, Quiet Diplomacy and Personal Conversation: Track Two
Diplomacy and the Search for a Settlement in Northern Ireland, in AFTER THE GOOD FRIDAY
AGREEMENT: ANALYSING POLITICAL CHANGE IN NORTHERN IRELAND Uoseph Ruane &Jen-
nifer Todd eds., 1999); Padraig O'Malley, Northern Ireland and South Africa : Hope and
History at a Crossroads, in NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED WORLD: POST AGREEMENT
NORTHERN IRELAND IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (John McGarry ed., 2001) [hereinafter
MCGARRY, NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED WORLI)].
58. See EAMON MALLIE & DAVID McKrIIRICK, THE FIGI-IT FOR PEACE: THE SECRET
SIORY BEHIND THE IRISH PEACE PROCFSS (1996); see also CONOR O'CLARY, THE GREENING
OF THE WHrIEHOUSE (1997); BRENDAN ANDERSON, JOE CAHILL: A LIFE IN THE IRA
(2002).
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first, the international body on decommissioning of weapons
and then, the peace negotiations proper. This decision seemed
to offer firm evidence that the two governments were committed
to a joint stewardship that would be exercised (at the very least
symbolically) through an international prism.
The Agreement itself relied considerably upon a range of
international peacemaking ideas. For example, the centrality of
human rights in the accord, evidenced by the provisions relating
to the incorporation of the ECHR, the establishment of a
Human Rights Commission, and the drafting of a Bill of Rights,
mirror other recent constitutional peacemaking efforts which
privilege such discourses."' The consociational aspects of the
Agreement noted above drew extensively on the work of the
Dutch political scientist, Arend Lijphart. He, in turn, has argued
that the intellectual precedence of such arrangements can be
traced to include the work of Dutch politicians in 1917, Leba-
nese politicians in 1943, Austrian Politicians in 1945, Malaysian
politicians in 1955, Colombian politicians in 1958, Indian politi-
cians in the 1960s and 1970s, South Africa in the early 1990s,
and Northern Ireland in 1973.") While some commentators may
have questioned the interpretation of the various international
experiences that shaped the discourse in Northern Ireland,"
and indeed others have argued that the Belfast Agreement actu-
ally improved upon certain key weaknesses of models drawn
from the international context,62 no one disputes the fact that
what Belmont et al. have referred to as "the clay for the constitu-
tional designers" of the Agreement, was distinctly international in
origin. 3
The Agreement also saw the "delegation" of particularly dif-
ficult issues of conflict transformation to bodies that included a
specific international dimension. Of particular interest were the
provisions with regard to the release of politically-motivated pris-
oners, the creation of a new policing service, and the decommis-
59. See CHRISTINE BELL, PEACI AGREEMENTS AND HUMAN RIGHTS (2000).
60. See AREND LIPIHART, PATI ERNS OF DEMOCRACY: GOVERNMENT FORMS AND PER-
FORMANCE IN 36 COUNTRIES (1999).
61. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra n.25; Wilson, sup/ra n.38.
62. See John McGarry, Introduction: The Comparable Northern Ireland, in MCGARRY,
NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE DIVIDED WORLD, sulra n. 1; see also O'Leary, supra n.2, at
293.
63. See Belmont, supra n.1, at 1 (emphasis added).
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sioning of illegally held paramilitary weapons. Given the obvious
sensitivities of releasing early paramilitary prisoners, much of the
public and private discussions in Northern Ireland on the matter
drew considerably upon similar international experiences. The
negotiations leading to the provisions on prisoner release were
considerably influenced by a large comparative international
study of similar processes in a range of other jurisdictions, car-
ried out by a local voluntary organization."' The Agreement de-
tailed that prisoner release would entail the establishment of
commissions in the North and South, excluded organizations
not on cease-fire, contained a two-year timeframe by which all
qualifying prisoners would be released, and a deadline for ena-
bling legislation. The release process itself in the North was
overseen by the Sentences Review Commission, an independent
body co-chaired by a South African lawyer, Brian Currin, and a
retired civil servant, Sir John Blelloch. Currin's appointment in
particular (he had chaired the Amnesty Commission in South
Africa), was explicitly designed to reassure the parties associated
with paramilitary groups that the Commission would be prag-
matic on the question of prisoner release."" Within the context
of very specific provisions contained in the Agreement itself, this
internationalizing of the prisoner issue was a mechanism for fram-
ing what was, for many people, an unpalatable aspect of the
Agreement as a difficult but necessary element of conflict trans-
formation best achieved in the most pragmatic fashion possi-
ble.""
The attempts at creating a new policing dispensation in the
jurisdiction have also sought to internationalize one of the most
difficult aspects of the peace process. Under the Agreement, an
independent commission was established under the chairman-
ship of former Hong Kong Governor, Chris Patten, and included
a number of prominent international policing experts tasked
with making "recommendations for future policing arrangements in
Northern Ireland including means of encouraging widespread commu-
64. See Chris Ryder, INSIDE THE MAZE: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE NORTHERN IRE-
LAND PRISON SERVICE 322 (2000).
65. See Kieran McEvoy, Prisoners, T[he Agreement and the Political Character of the North-
ern heland Conflict, 22 FORDFIAM INT'IL L.I. 1539, 1559 n.83 (1999).
66. See Michael Von Tangen Page, A Most Difficult and Unpalatable Pact: The Release
of Politically Motivated Pitsoners, in Cox, A FARFWELL io ARMS?, supra n.56.
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nity support for these arrangements.""'7 In carrying out that man-
date, the Patten Commission mirrored the work of two impor-
tant earlier pieces of comparative policing research that had in-
formed the negotiations. 6' As well as its extensive public
consultations, the Patten Commission visited police services in
Canada, Spain, South Africa, the United States, as well as the
Garda Siochana and a number of British regional forces." The
influence of these international experiences is evident through-
out the Patten Report. For example, the Patten recommenda-
tions on public order policing and the District Policing Partner-
ship Boards draw considerably upon the South African experi-
ence. The recommendations regarding the policing board and
Police Ombudsman utilize similar concepts in Canada,7 ' and
much of the "partnership" discussion in the Report draws heavily
on the U.S. community policing experience and literature.7 '
Finally, the necessity of an "international" dimension to the
vexed question of the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons,
has always been viewed as essential by those who were genuinely
interested in achieving it. The chronology of this process is par-
ticularly complex, but some detail is necessary in order to high-
light the broader significance of international input into the
process.7" The initial involvement in 1995 and 1996 of senior
67. Agreement, supra n.3, Strand Three (emphasis added).
68. See generally MARY O'RmVL & LINA, MOORE, HUMAN RIGHTS ON Du'i: PRINCI-
ILES FOR BIIER POLICING, INTERNATIONAL LESSONS FOR NORTHERN IRELANI) (1997);
JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'IxARY, POI:IN ; NOFRIIERN IRELAND: PROIVOSAILS FOR A
Niw START (1999).
69. THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON POLICING FOR NORTHERN IREIANI), A NEW
BEG;INNING: POLICING IN NORTHERN IREILNI) I1 (1999).
70. See Clifford Shearing, A Nodal Conceplion of Goveaance: Thoughts on A Policing
Cotmission, 11 POLICING; AND Soc. 259 (2001).
71. Id. at 41.
72. The issue (of weapons decommissioning has bedevilled the Irish peace process
since the mid-1990s. Republicans view it as tantamount to a demand to surrenider by an
undefeated army and a deliberate attempt to demand the impossible in order to block
the process of conflict transfornation. Unionists view it as a litmus test of the Republi-
cans' seriolsness abotIt peace, and the ctystallization of the view that the retention of a
private army is incompatible with democracy. All accept that little attention is paid to
the decommissioning of Loyalist weapons, despite their ongoing campaigns of violence.
In March 1995, seven months after the first IRA cease-fire, the then Conservative Coy-
eminent insisted that decommissioning should take place as a precondition to Sinn
Fin's participation in the negotiations. In an effort to overcome the ensuing stale-
mate, the Mitchell Commission (discussed above) outlined compromise proposals
wherein negotiating parties had to sign Up to six principles of non-violence and com-
mitment to democracy. The Commission also recommended that some decommission-
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international figures in the Mitchell Commission, was designed
ing should take place during, and not before, negotiations. The British government
rejected this proposal, contributing significantly to the breakdown of the first IRA
cease-fire. Following the change in government in the UK, the two governments revis-
ited the Mitchell proposals and agreed to establish a further independent body to over-
see decommissioning (the Independent International Commission on Decommission-
ing), to be chaired by Canadian General John De Chastelain, himself a member of the
Mitchell Commission. Legislation was also introduced to deal with the modalities of
decommissioning.
When the Agreement was signed in April 1998, it required the signatories to reaf-
firm their commitment to disarmament, to "work constructively to use their infitence
to achieve decommissioning within two years of a referendum and in the context of the
implementation of the overall settlement." Various initiatives were then attempted to
"sequence" the guns versus government quandary, with the Ulster Unionists insisting
that Sinn Fin could not take up seats on the Executive, unless decommissioning had
begun, and Republicans insisting that they were entitled to the ministerial seats on the
basis on their mandate and their good faith in seeking to influence decommissioning,
as specified under the Agreement. Two attempts were made by the British and Irish
governments to, in effect, impose a solution in April 1999 and July 1999. These were
rejected by Republicans and Unionists, respectively. After a further independent review
chaired by Senator Mitchell, the sequencing issue was resolved by an agreement that
devolution should take effect, then the Executive should meet, and then the paramili-
tary groups should appoint their authorized representatives to meet with the Indepen-
dent Commission, all on the same day, in that order.
Powers were devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly and the power-sharing
Executive on December 2, 1999, but the government was short-lived. Disagreement
over progress on decommissioning led to the suspension of the Executive in February
2000. After protracted negotiations, the IRA announced it was ready to begin a process
to put its weapons "completely and verifiably" beyond use and checked regularly by two
international arms inspectors, the former ANC negotiator, Cyril Ramaphosa, and the
former Finnish president, Martti Ahtisaari. Powers were restored to the Assembly and
the Executive on May 22, 2000. OnJune 26, 2000, it was announced that the two inter-
national arms inspectors had examined three IRA arms dumps and verified that they
were beyond use. By October 2000, the Ulster Unionist Party was still unhappy with the
IRA's failure to engage constructively with the Independent International Commission
on Decommissioning ("IICD"), and banned Sinn Fhin ministers from attending cross-
border ministerial meetings. The IRA broke off contacts with the decommissiong body.
After further intensive negotiations, the IRA agreed to recommence contacts. Further
international inspections failed to satisfy Unionists' demands and on July 1, 2001, David
Trimble resigned in protest at the IRA's failtre to decommission. In October 2001, the
IRA announced that a process of putting arms beyond use had begun, and this was
subsequently verified by the IICD. The legislation on decommissioning was amended
in January 2002, extending the deadline for another year, with the option for further
annual extensions tip to 2007. In October 2002, the Executive was suspended for the
fourth time following the withdrawal of the Ulster Unionists, and the IRA broke off
contacts with the IICD once more. See generally Kieran McEvoy & Brian Gormally, Seeing
is Believing: Positivist Terrorology, Peacemaking Criminology, and the Northern Ireland Peace
Process, 8 CRITICAL CRIMINOLOGY 9 (1997); Colin Mclnnes, A Farewell to Arms?: Decommis-
sioning and the Peace Process, in Cox, A FAREWE.LL ro ARMS?, supra n.56; Kirsten Schulze,
Taking the Gun Out of Politics: Conflict Trans formation in Northern Ireland and Lebanon, in
McGARRY, NORTHERN IRELAND AND TIiE Divioiv' WORLD, sulpra n.1.
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explicitly to circumnavigate the obvious difficulties, for Republi-
cans in particular, of even discussing the notion of decommis-
sioning weapons with the British government. The international
character of this element of the process has been continuously
stressed through the nomenclature and personnel involved.
These include the body charged with overseeing the modalities
of decommissioning (the Independent International Commis-
sion on Decommissioning, chaired by Canadian General De
Chastelaine), and the individuals tasked with inspecting and ver-
ifying that a number of IRA dumps were beyond use (the Inter-
national Arms Inspectors, former ANC negotiator Cyril
Ramaphosa and former Finnish President Martti Ahtisaari). At
each stage in this tortuous process, the ability of each of the pro-
tagonists to publicly depend on the integrity and reliability of in-
ternational honest brokers, has been crucial in moving their re-
spective constituencies forward in the process.
Finally, Northern Ireland has been supported and en-
couraged by material assistance from the EU. Some commenta-
tors have argued that the structures of the EU created a frame-
work, which assisted both the British and the Irish governments
to approach the Northern Ireland problem as ajoint managerial
one.73 Beyond this, the EU has provided significant funding
through its Special Support Programmes, established in re-
sponse to the peace process and implemented through the
PEACE I (1995-1999) and PEACE II (2000-2004) programs.
The aim of the former was to "reinforce progress towards a
peaceful and stable society and to promote reconciliation, by in-
creasing economic development and employment, promoting
urban regeneration, developing cross-border co-operation and
extending social inclusion."7 4 PEACE II carries forward the over-
73. One commentator has gone so far as to argue that "one of the striking things
about the Agreement is that, to anyone who knows the European Union, one immedi-
ately recognises that it was written by people who also know the European Union and
have worked its systems quite extensively." Rory O'Donnell, Fixing the Institutions, in No
FRONTIERS, NORTH-SOUTH INTEGRATION IN IRELAND 70 (R. Wilson ed., 1999) (cited in
Elizabeth Meehan, Europe and Europeanisation of the Irish Question, in Cox, A FAREWELL
-O ARMS?, supra n.56; see also Gordon Anthony & Andrew Evans, Northern Ireland, Devolu-
lion and the European Union, in HUMAN Ricins EQUALITY AND DEMOCRAII RENEWAL IN
NORTHERN IRELAND (Colin Harvey ed., 2001).
74. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SPECIAL SUPPORT PROGRAMME FOR PEACE AND RECONCII.-
IATION IN NORTHERN IRELAND AND THE BORDER COUNTIES OF IREIAND 1995-1999,
EUROIINK Si Pp., No. 9. (1995).
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all aim of its antecedent, but with a new economic focus. District
partnerships have been replaced by Local Strategy Partnerships,
which are responsible for locally-based regeneration and devel-
opment strategies, and for addressing grassroots needs with local
delivery mechanisms (PEACE II - priority 3). Other EU Commu-
nity initiatives, some of which predate the peace process, (such
as the INTERREG cross-border program), have also contributed
by focusing, in particular, upon overcoming problems of social
exclusion and rural regeneration on a cross-border basis in the
border counties.
In sum, international interest has been central to the pro-
cess of conflict transformation in Northern Ireland. During the
conflict, we have appeared to revel in our complexity, celebrate
our uniqueness, and assent to the insolubility of our conflict.
Placing the Northern Ireland peace process on the international
stage has been crucial in removing that burdensome mystique.
International influences on constitutional peacemaking have
been contextual, intellectual, and processual. Changes in the in-
ternational political configurations, including the end of the
Cold War and the willingness of an American administration to
become directly involved, certainly changed the context in
which the negotiations occurred. The constitutional architec-
ture of the Agreement itself drew heavily upon international ex-
perience and political science expertise. The process of com-
pleting the negotiations and managing the post-conflict transfor-
mation concerning a number of particularly difficult issues have
been explicitly internationalized, not in the least in order to allow
the various protagonists to take their respective bases further
than they might have originally envisaged. Of course, this pro-
cess has not been one-way traffic. Northern Ireland politicians
have been internationally feted for their achievements, two have
become Nobel Peace Laureates, others have been called to pres-
tigious gatherings to offer advice on other peace processes in
areas such as the Middle East - acclaim and prestige, which has
(in theory at least) further wedded our indigenous politicians to
the pathway of peace.
75. For further details see Colin Knox, Partnerships: A Briefing Paper for the Northern
Ireland Executive Review of Public Administration in Northern Ireland (2002), available at
http://www.rpani.gov.uk/partnerships/index.htn; see also John Morison, Democracy,
Governance and Governmentality; Civic Public Space and Constitutional Renewal in Northern
Ireland, 21 OXFORDJ. LEGAL STUD. 287 (2001).
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IV. SOURCES OF CONSTITLTIONAL PEACEMAKING:
CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM AND THE REPUBLIC
OF IRELAND
The final series of influences that contributed to the process
of constitutional peacemaking are the projects of constitutional
reform in the UK, and, to a lesser extent, the Republic of Ire-
land.
A. Constitutional Reform in the UK
Constitutional reform in the UK is traditionally viewed as an
incremental process of informal change to an informal struc-
ture. Given this, it may be only a slight exaggeration to describe
Tony Blair as the most far-reaching and radical reformer of the
formal edifice of the constitution since Oliver Cromwell.7" The
ambition and scale of the Labour government's reform project is
as remarkable as its speedy implementation. Promises of a
human rights act, freedom of information legislation, House of
Lords reform, and an elected authority for London, were given
formal expression within a year of the election of 1997. Other
significant constitutional changes, such as the announcement of
the independence of the Bank of England in 1997, were
achieved even more quickly, although less directly. A variety of
more long-term reforms of aspects of the constitution have been
handed over to a variety of bodies for further consideration,
with, for example, the Neill Committee considering the funding
of political parties, 77 the Jenkins Commission reporting on pro-
portional representation, 8 and the Royal Commission, chaired
by Lord Wakeham, reporting on the future of the House of
Lords. 79 As the second term of the New Labour government
progresses, and difficulties continue over the exact shape of a
76. SeeJohn Morison, The Case Against Constitutional Reform?, 25J.L. & Soc'v 510,
511 (1998).
77. See generally Ben Seyd, Electoral Systens and Party Funding, in Ti.- CHANGING
CONSTrrruIION (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 4th ed. 2000); Keith Ewing, Trans-
parency, Accountability and Equality: The Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000,
2001 PUB. L. 542 (2001).
78. See RO\'JENKINS, REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON TI-IE VOTING SYS-
TFM (1998), available at http://www.fairvote.org/libraIy/geog/eLurope/jenkins.htm.
79. See JOHN WAKEFIAM, ROYAL COMMISSION ON THlE REFORM OF THE HousF 0n
LORDS, A HOUSE FOR THE FUTURE CM 4543 (2000), available at http://www.archive.offi-
cial-documents.co.uk/document/cmn45/4534.htm.
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newly reformed House of Lords, the emphasis has moved away
from the large-scale reform of the formal apparatus of the con-
stitution. Now, the focus is mainly on a process of "moderniza-
tion" of the public sector."
Of course, standing above all these reforms is the devolu-
tion of power from the center to some of the constituent regions
or countries within the UK.8" For some commentators, moderni-
zation and devolution are closely related. Burrows, for example,
argues that "it is clear that New Labour equates modernisation . .with
the devolution of power to what might be termed the non-English regions
of the United Kingdom." 2 Notwithstanding the degree of linkage
between the two major reforms, devolution stands as perhaps the
most significant legacy of the New Labour government. Since
1998, there has been an asymmetrical system of devolution oper-
ating in the UK. Scotland has its own Parliament with extensive
legislative powers, as well as a limited tax-raising capacity, and an
Executive drawn from a coalition of the main political parties.
Wales has a form of administrative devolution with a National
Assembly (Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru), which has executive and
subordinate legislative powers in more limited areas. Devolved
government, in effect, has been restored to Northern Ireland,
although in a different form than before. England remains the
exception, insofar as devolution for the various regions remains
80. The initial phase of modernization heralded by an important White Paper,
Modernising Government, CM 4310 (1999), is now developing through a second phase.
Some of the initial modernization programs have been retained, some have mutated,
and some have withered away. See also http://www.cabinet-office.gov.uk/eeg/second
phase.htm. A new document, ReJbrming Our Public Services: Principles into Practice (Mar.
2002), offers "four principles of public sector reform," which turn out to involve na-
tional standards, devolution and delegation, flexibility, and expanding choice. See also
http://www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5624.asp. This overall program is based,
essentially, on developing consumer focus, improving public sector performance, and
taking advantage of new information and communication technology. The idea of
modernization provides a "brand" to describe a general process of change in the health
service, education and, particularly, local government. It also, however, involves a more
general orientation in the organization of government, requiring a new approach or
style in government operations. This is oriented essentially around reinvigorating pub-
lic services by bringing in different concepts of efficiency, including elements of private
sector efficiency, but without ceding control to the same extent as with earlier versions
of privatization.
81. See Alan Ward, Devolution: Labour's Strange Constitutional "Design," in THE
CHANGING CONSTITUTION (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn Oliver eds., 2000) (emphasis added)
(emphasis added).
82. See NOREEN BURROWS, DEVOLUION 21 (2000) (emphasis added).
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only a possibility. However, it is one that may gather impetus
following the White Paper on regional government published in
2002.
The devolution program is a significant change to the struc-
ture of government in the UK. As Burrows concludes, devolu-
tion adds another layer of government to what is already a multi-
layered legal and political society, and because devolution is une-
ven across the UK, it also creates a multi-textured State.8" How-
ever, it is interesting to consider exactly how the changes in
Northern Ireland are presented within this, the general program
of constitutional reform.
In a sense, the Northern Ireland peace process stands above
and apart from all of these modifications to the structures and
processes of government in the rest of the UK. The peace pro-
cess that began in 1993, is best seen as an historic effort at re-
moving the Irish from British politics, if not yet the British from
Irish politics. In many ways, and in direct contrast to the pattern
of other reforms, it is a political act represented as a constitu-
tional one. Perhaps for this reason, constitutional writers have
difficulty placing it within their accounts of the changing consti-
tution. Northern Ireland has always been a rather uncertain sub-
ject within UK constitutional writing, either being forced un-
comfortably within a framework of analysis that pertains mainly
in the rest of the UK, or ignored altogether.8 4 A survey of major
textbooks on the constitution reveals these approaches to be
continuing in relation to the Northern Ireland version of devolu-
tion. Some textbooks take the opportunity to remedy a general
neglect of Northern Ireland by detailing the devolution settle-
ment in Northern Ireland in direct comparative context of Scot-
land and Wales, as though it were basically similar. a5 Others are
less comfortable about seeing Northern Ireland as simply an-
other instance of devolution and modernization within the UK
mold, and stress that while the background and history make it
distinct, "Northern Ireland may be grouped with England and Wales as
83. Id. at 1.
84. SeeJoHIN MORISON & STEPIEN LIVINGSTONF, RESHAPING PUBIIC POWER: NORTH-
ERN IREL-AND AND TIHF BRITISH CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS 111-15 (1996).
85. See, e.g., DAVID POLLARD ET AL.., CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
TEXT WITHr MAIRIAIS (3rd ed. 2000); PAUI .JACK'SON & PATRICIA LEOPOLD, 0. HOOD
PI-IIIIS ANDJACSON CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (8th ed. 2001); HIlAIRE
BARNE1I ", CONSTITUTIONAI. AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (4th ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
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providing an instance of devolved government."8 Finally, there is an
approach that simply continues to see Northern Ireland as too
difficult. For example one quite major textbook, while carrying
the subtitle "A Critical Introduction," simply ignores Northern Ire-
land altogether and is content to offer only a chapter entitled
"Scols and Welsh Devolution." 7
Clearly from a British perspective generally, Northern Ire-
land is a constitutional oddity: it is not exactly external to the
British experience, but it is not firmly a part of it either. North-
ern Ireland does not fit readily into New Labour views of "mod-
ern" Britain. It is not perhaps overly cynical to see the medium-
term solution for Britain in terms of removing the Northern
Irish problem from the agenda of British politics, and the cur-
rent peace process as an exit strategy. Indeed, the history of in-
terventions since the 1970s has shown a search for a constitu-
tional "big fix" that will satisfy Nationalists, placate Unionists,
and remove a politically and financially draining problem. In-
deed, so great is the prize of getting rid of the Northern Ireland
problem that whenever a solution seems possible there have
been few limits on resources expendable to achieve this -
whether they be blueprints from civil servants, personal interven-
tions from the Prime Ministers, or another layer of commissions
or inquiries to head off a potential political difficulty.88 In this
way, the Northern Ireland version of devolution is about much
more than regional government. Devolution in Northern Ire-
land coincides with devolution elsewhere in the UK, but it is per-
forming a much greater political function where the stakes are
higher, the risks more intense, and the costs even greater.
86. See ANTiHONY BRADLEY & KErIII EWING, CONsrIrurIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW 47 (13th ed. 2002) (emphasis added).
87. IAN LOVELAND, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw\: A CRITICA\L INTRODUCFION (2d ed.
2000).
88. It is relatively easy to find examples of how various factions have used the peace
process to broker a whole range of costly solutions to what elsewhere might be regarded
as fairly minor problems. See, e.g., John Morison, Democracy, Governance and Govern-
mentality: Civic Public Space and Constitutional Renewal in Northern Ireland, 21 OXFORD J.
LEGAL S-rui. 287, 290-95 (2001). Managing issues of more obvious importance, such as
the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, has also proved extremely expensive. The cost of the Saville
Inquiry is estimated to be around £120 million, and senior barristers representing the
families receive a daily fee that is twenty-four times the average daily income of those
who work, and forty-one times the daily benefit of an unemployed married couple with
two children. See Paddy Hillyard, Invoking Indignation: Reflections on Future Directions of
Socio-Legal Studies, 29 J.L. & Soc'v 645, 649 n.12 (2002).
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B. Constitutional Reform in the Irish Republic
Since the partition of the island and the drafting of the Irish
Free State Constitution in 1922, constitutional discourses in the
southern part of the island have always been central to the pros-
pects for peace in the North. The definition of the "national
territory" in Articles Two and Three of the 1937 constitution,
which includes the six counties of the North East, was viewed as
proof positive by Unionists of the hostile intent of the Irish Re-
public."'j Unionists were angered that the Republic's territorial
claim was given particular focus in the two major attempts in the
1970s and 1980s at reaching some British-Irish consensus on the
resolution of the Northern problem. The abortive Sunningdale
Agreement in 1973 provoked extreme Unionist anger because,
as well as power-sharing arrangements in Northern Ireland, it
envisaged a "Council of Ireland" with a linked advisory assembly.
While the exact status of these bodies was hotly contested, such
discussions became academic when the Executive collapsed in
1974. Of more impact, however, was the Anglo-Irish Agreement,
signed in 1985."" This Agreement gave the Irish government,
for the first time, a consultative role in the governance of the
North in return for increased security co-operation, in order to
more effectively tackle Republican paramilitarism"' Despite
widespread Unionist protest, the Anglo-Irish Agreement re-
mained in place until the signing of the Belfast Agreement in
1998. In effect, the Irish Republic's position on Articles Two
and Three of its constitution and the Anglo-Irish Agreement be-
came central to the overall package negotiated in the late 1990s.
Articles Two and Three came to particular prominence in
1988, when two Ulster Unionist brothers, availed of their rights
as Irish citizens, challenged the constitutionality of the Irish gov-
ernment's signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Their argu-
ment was essentially that the signing of the Agreement contra-
vened Articles Two and Three, which defined Northern Ireland
as part of Irish national territory. The Irish Supreme Court
ruled that the reintegration of the national territory of Ireland
89. Unionists have also argued that the Irish constitution is sectarian by pointing
to the preamble to the 1937 constitution which refers to "the Holy trinity" and the fact
that, until 1972, the constitution afforded a privileged position to the Catholic Church.
90. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra n.36.
91. See TOM HADDEN & KFVIN BOYLE, Tiii ANGLO-IRIsHI AGREEMENT COMMENTARY,
TEXT AND OFFICIAL RE 'IEW ( 1989).
[Vol. 26:961
BEYOND THE "CONSTITUTIONAL MOMENT"
was a "constitutional imperative," and that the limitations out-
lined in Article Three of the laws enacted by the Irish Parliament
did not derogate from the "claim as a legal right to the entire na-
tional territory."'92 Unionists viewed this ruling as providing justifi-
cation for the IRA's campaign of violence, something akin to
"Eire's claim to Lebensraum - the equivalent to Hitler's claim over
Czechoslovakia. "'
In the documents preceding the formal negotiating of the
Belfast Agreement, the Irish government made clear that while it
would countenance a new treaty to replace the Anglo-Irish
Agreement and introduce a referendum which would be neces-
sary to change Articles Two and Three of the Irish constitution,
this could only occur in the context of an overall settlement.94
The new British-Irish Agreement essentially codified a number
of preceding documents between the two governments, includ-
ing the Anglo-Irish Agreement (1985), "- the Joint Declaration
(1993), ' and the Joint Framework Document (1995). It con-
cerns issues such as the status of Northern Ireland, the principles
of consent and self-determination, the recognition and protec-
tion of the both identities and cultures in Northern Ireland, and
guarantees of dual citizenship rights in all circumstances. The
agreed wording of the new Article Two of the Irish constitution
redefines the Irish Nation as "all of those born in Ireland." The
new Article Three reiterates the will of the Irish Nation to "unite
all the people who share the territory of the people of Ireland,"
but adds that a united Ireland can only come about through the
consent of the people in both jurisdictions. In addition, a new
92. McGimpsey & McGimpsey v. Ireland, [1990] (Ir. S.C.) (emphasis added).
93. See JOHN MCGARRY & BRENDAN O'LEARY, EXPLAINING NORTHERN IRELAND 98
(1994) (citing Chris McGimpsey, UUP Annual Conference (Oct. 1990)) (emphasis ad-
ded). The then leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, James Molyneaux, has also referred
earlier that summer to the claim being equivalent to Iraq's irredentist claim over Ku-
wait. Id.
94. See David Byrne, An Irish View af the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement: The Interac-
tion of Law and Politics, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1206, 1217 (1999); Martin Mansergh, The
Background to the Northern Ireland Peace Process, in Cox, A FAREWELL TO ARMS?, supra n.56,
at 21.
95. Anglo-Irish Agreement, supra n.36.
96. Joint Declaration by An Taoiseach, Mr. Albert Reynolds, T.D., and the British
Prime Minister, the Rt. Hon. John Major, M.P, Dec. 15, 1993.
97. The Joint Framework Document, A shared understanding between the British
and Irish Governments to assist discussion and negotiation involving the Northern Ire-
land parties (Feb. 22, 1995).
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Article Three allows for the establishment of the North/South
institutions and the sharing of executive powers between the two
jurisdictions.
At one reading, the Irish government's willingness to coun-
tenance significant constitutional change (including amending
the constitution and the ceding of sovereignty from the Ddil to
the All-Ireland bodies) may be viewed as the culmination of a
series of efforts from Sunningdale onwards, to secure structures
of governance for the North, which were acceptable to the Na-
tionalist community therein. In particular, one of the driving
dynamics of Irish policy with regard to the North from the 1980s
onwards, was to support the position of constitutional national-
ism in the North, represented by the SDLP, in order to stem the
political growth of Sinn Fin. Once Republicans' intentions
regarding the ending of violence were adjudged as genuine in
the early 1990s, the Irish government's role under Albert Reyn-
olds shifted to focusing on supporting the peace-builders within
Republicanism."" The Irish government's attitudes to issues
such as the "permanence" of the cessations and prisoner release
in the wake of the cease-fires, were considerably more imagina-
tive than those of the British.""' With no equivalent discourse to
the UK's devolutionary process (within which the peace process
could at least be framed when politically suitable), the Irish gov-
ernment's view of constitutional peacemaking appeared to be
one of traditional statecraft based on political pragmatism. Se-
curing and maintaining the cease-fires required (and received)
political imagination from the government of Albert Reynolds.
Managing the negotiations required common stewardship of the
process with the British government. Movement on issues, such
as the constitutional amendments, were cards to be played at the
negotiating table in the securing of a key foreign policy objec-
tive.
In addition to the constitutional changes and the cross-bor-
98. See Mansergh, supra n.94, at 21.
99. For example, in 1995 the Irish government established the National Forum for
Peace and Reconciliation, chaired by Supreme Court Judge, Catherine McGuinness.
Although boycotted by the Unionist parties, the Forum was attended by all of the other
political parties in Ireland, including Sinn Ffin, and took a wide range of submissions.
As Justice McGuinness recently told one of the authors: " . . . the explicit aim of the
Forum was to help bring the 'Shinners' [Sinn Fin] in from the cold." (Interview on file
with authors).
100. See McEvoy & Gormally, supra n.72.
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der bodies, clearly the Agreement has additional practical impli-
cation for the governance of the Irish Republic in areas such as
equality and human rights. °1 However, what is perhaps only be-
coming more obvious in the wake of the implementation of the
Agreement, is that while the Irish government's focus on the
Agreement was primarily through the foreign policy prism (pri-
marily through the work of the Department of Foreign Affairs),
less attention may have been paid to the impact of the imple-
menting aspects of the Agreement on domestic political life in the
Irish Republic. Certainly, the Irish government's insistence on
transparency and accountability, and an oft-stated commitment
to the human rights and equality agenda in Northern Ireland,
have been somewhat undermined by the manner of the govern-
ment's implementation of key aspects of the Agreement in the
Republic."°2 It remains to be seen whether the Agreement will
have an ameliorative domestic effect on some of the less savory
aspects of political culture in the Irish Republic.'""3
CONCLUSION
As the Northern Ireland Peace Process moves beyond its ini-
101. The Agreement committed the Irish government to establish a Human Rights
Commission, ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minori-
ties, implement Enhanced Employment Equality Legislation, introduce Equal Status
legislation, take further steps to demonstrate its respect for the different traditions on
the island of Ireland, and establish a Joint Committee of representatives of the two
Human Rights Commission. See Agreement, supra n.3, art. 9.
102. For example, the Irish government was strongly criticized for ignoring the
recommendations of an independent selection committee for appointments to its
Human Rights Commission, and instead, appointing individuals with close connections
to the main political parties in the Republic. See Press Release, Irish Council for Civil
Liberties, ICCL Expresses Dismay At Rejection Of Selection Committee's Recommen-
dations For Human Rights Commission (Dec. 6, 2000), available at http://www.iccl.ie/
constitution/gen/00_HRCappts.html. Such was the political furor over the appoint-
ments, that the government relented and accepted a number of the appointments put
forward by the original selection committee. Similarly, despite their apparent qualifica-
tion for early release tinder the terms of the Agreement, the Irish government has to
date refused to take the politically unpopular decision to authorize the release of a
number of IRA prisoners convicted of the murder of an Irish police officer. See Minister
Willie O'Dea Condemns Martin Ferris's Call for Release Of Det. Garda McCabe's Killers on the
Internet and the World Wide Web, available at http://www.willieodea.ie/speeches&state
ments.asp?StorylD=1 76.
103. See, e.g., Paddy O'Carroll, Strokes, Cute Hoors and Sneaking Regarders: The Influ-
ence of Local Culture on Irish Political Style, 2 IRISH POL. STUn. 77 (1999); John Coakley,
Society and Political Culture, in Poi nICs IN THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND (John Coakley &
Michael Gallagher eds., 3rd ed. 1999).
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tial constitutional moment, it sheds light on deeper changes in
the notion of constitutionalism and especially the British version
of constitutionalism. Traditionally, in the UK, constitutionalism
emphasizes formal institutions, informal practices and under-
standings and above all, concepts of sovereignty. This has meant
that generally, British versions of constitutionalism have strug-
gled at a theoretical level to accommodate fundamental changes
in the way that public power has been reconfigured by globaliza-
tion-changed relations between the State, civil society, and the
private sector, and a transformed notion of what a State should
do. An additional challenge to traditional approaches now
comes from the peace process in Northern Ireland and the new
constitutional dynamic that is created there.
Previous efforts at brokering a constitutional "solution" to
the Northern Ireland "problem" concentrated on providing a
"big fix" in terms of a political deal which could then be ren-
dered into an institutional form that would square the constitu-
tional circle. Such a moment of constitutional agreement be-
tween the parties, however fleeting, could then be realized
through an act of Parliament giving effect to whatever complex
mechanisms are required to satisfy each of the parties. Of
course, when such solutions threatened to fail, they could be re-
voked by a stroke of the pen by the same sovereign Parliament
that introduced them. Successive British Secretaries of State
would then return to the long rounds of negotiations, while civil
servants and constitutional experts would be returned to their
drawing boards to devise yet more elaborate structures to factor
in the ever-increasing range of demands and imperatives.
At some levels, the Good Friday Agreement does provide
another such grand level "constitutional fix." It certainly does
establish a highly complex mechanism for government. It also
remains subject to the control of a sovereign Parliament through
the Northern Ireland Act 2000, which can be invoked at will to
suspend its operation. However, the settlement provided by the
Good Friday Agreement and the Northern Act 1998 is funda-
mentally much more ambitious too. It offers a glimpse of a new
model of constitutionalism within the UK approach. This new
model is alive to the general international context, and the ben-
eficial influence that aspects of this can exert. It is grounded in
establishing relationships between the various elements of the
increasingly disaggregated domestic polity as it seeks to link the
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new devolutionary institutions in Northern Ireland with those
being developed elsewhere in the UK. It is aware of the impor-
tance of other players in the conflict, particularly the govern-
ment of the Republic of Ireland and it is interwoven with signifi-
cant (and potentially far-reaching) constitutional change in that
jurisdiction too. Above all, it is rooted in the expression of the
will of the people of Ireland, both North and South, who have
endorsed this not so much as an answer to the question about
who has power (which remains to be resolved by the usual politi-
cal means), but rather, as providing the framework within which
it can be decided how power will be exercised, and the ways in
which people will agree to live together. Beyond the complex
structures for sharing institutional power, the important and ex-
tensive equality and rights agenda within the settlement provides
the material with which to construct answers to the fundamental
ethical problems of how to live together. These are truly consti-
tutional questions and in this sense, the Agreement is truly a
constitutional and constituting document. In one or two impor-
tant constitutional cases that have pointed the way towards new
understandings of constitutional norms that go beyond simple
ideas of the sovereignty of Parliament, even the judiciary, who
are conditioned to follow the will of Parliament, as expressed in
ordinary words, have recognized that this act of Parliament may
be different. Beyond the "constitutional moment" that is the
Good Friday Agreement, it may be that there is something very
important happening.
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